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Introduction
Since the birth of the Federal Arbitration Act2 (“FAA”) in 1925, the
United States has maintained a national policy favoring arbitration.3
The FAA empowered courts to modify, correct, and even vacate arbitral
awards4 to promote the efficiency and fidelity of the parties in the arbitral process. However, because arbitration is a favored litigation mechanism, the vacatur of arbitral awards demands a very high standard.
Specifically, courts can only vacate arbitral awards in four situations:
(1) where an award is obtained through fraud, corruption, or “undue
means;” (2) where the arbitrators showed partiality and/or corruption;
(3) where the arbitrators “were guilty of misconduct;” or, (4) where the
arbitrators “exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that
Juris Doctor, American University-Washington College of Law, 2012
9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (1925).
3
The FAA granted state and federal courts the power to enforce arbitral decisions
in cases that involve any “maritime transaction or . . . contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.” Id. at § 2.
4
9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11.
1
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a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.”5
In addition to the statutory reasons enunciated in the FAA, federal
and state courts have vacated arbitral awards upon a finding that the
arbitrator’s decision displayed “manifest disregard of the law.” However,
this “manifest disregard” standard, which first appeared in Wilko v.
Swan,6 requires a finding of “willful defiance of clearly applicable law,
not just garden-variety legal error.”7 Additionally, because it had only
mentioned manifest disregard in dicta, the U.S. Supreme Court in Wilko
did not clearly define manifest disregard, thus leaving lower courts to
deal with its application.8
While Wilko was eventually overturned, manifest disregard has
become a doctrine. After considerable struggle over how to construe
manifest disregard, most federal circuit courts ruled that finding that
an arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the law “requires more than
an error of law and more than a failure by the arbitrator to understand
or apply the law.”9 In 2007, the Supreme Court decision in Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. split the circuit courts and added additional criteria.10 Previously where parties to an arbitration agreement
were able to contractually expand vacatur of arbitral awards, Hall Street
decided that parties to an arbitration agreement were not allowed to
expand the grounds for vacatur or modify arbitral awards. The Court
ultimately held that arbitral awards could only be vacated or modified
pursuant to sections §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA. However, the Court did
not specify whether the reason manifest disregard did not constitute
a free-standing ground for vacatur was that the doctrine was already
included in section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. Consequently, some courts and
legal scholars have interpreted Hall Street as the demise of manifest
disregard. Other courts, including the Second and Ninth Circuits, have

Id. at § 10(a)(1)-(4).
346 U.S. 427 (1956).
7
See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 Yale L.J. Online 1
(2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/2009/09/29/aragaki.html (last visited September 1,
2013).
8
Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards: Where does the Buck Stop? 61 Dis. Res. J. 4 (2007); see also Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427.
9
Id. at 6.
10
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 5786 (2008).
5
6
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determined that ‘manifest disregard’ was already included in the FAA
and have continued to apply the doctrine.
This article will explore the history and evolution of the manifest
disregard doctrine as a means of judicial arbitral vacatur. The seminal
decision of Hall Street, which has divided circuit courts, will also be
unpacked and clarified. While many courts have chosen to view Hall
Street as killing manifest disregard, and others have tried to apply
it through §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA, this paper will urge that a third
route be considered: the exclusionary theory. This theory asserts that
Hall Street’s narrow decision was limited only to contractual and private agreements to expand arbitral vacatur—not to judicial review of
manifest disregard. Ultimately, this article seeks to show that manifest
disregard is not dead and should remain a valued part of arbitration law.
I. Background of the FAA
A. A National Policy Favoring Arbitration
The purpose behind enacting the FAA in 1925 was to ensure the
validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements.11 In broad terms,
the FAA represented the establishment of a national policy favoring
arbitration.12 Congress considered it necessary to establish this policy

Jon O. Shimabukuro, Cong. Research Serv., The Federal Arbitration Act:
Background and Recent Developments 1, 1–9 (2002). See also Karly A. Kauf,
‘Manifest’ Destiny: The Fate Of The ‘Manifest Disregard Of The Law’ Doctrine After
Hall Street v. Mattel, 3 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 309, 309–10 (2010) (stating that
the FAA was enacted as “a reaction to widespread judicial resistance to arbitration” and
that its intent was to “ensure that contracts to arbitrate would be enforced”). See, e.g.,
Preston Douglas Wigner, Comment, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive
Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of
Section 2, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1499, 1501–03 (1995) (describing the background and
history of the FAA).
12
See Cong. Research Serv. at 1.
11
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because American judges were resistant to enforcing arbitral awards13
and agreements to arbitrate were revocable until an award was rendered.14 This reluctance of American judges to enforce arbitral awards
was rooted in English common law traditions,15 holding that agreements
to arbitrate wrongly “ousted” courts of their jurisdiction.16 This English
common law holding originates from two historical rationales: (1) pretwentieth century British judges worried that arbitration would result in
injustice,17 and (2) arbitration was perceived by many pre-twentieth century judges as an economic threat.18 It was not until 1889 that the British
Parliament passed a law to protect arbitration as a means of prioritizing
See id. (explaining how American judges inherited a certain hostility towards
arbitration from English judges, who were paid fees based on the number of cases
they decided). See also James E. Berger, Practitioner Note, The Evolution of Judicial
Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 5 NYU J.L. & Bus. 745, 746 (2009) (“prior
to the passage of the FAA, American courts were hostile to arbitration.”) (citing Hall
Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (recognizing that the FAA seeks to broadly overcome
judicial hostility towards arbitration); Brian T. Burns, Freedom, Finality, and Federal
Preemption: Seeking Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State
Law After Hall Street, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1814, 1817 (2011) (“judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce executory agreements to arbitrate.”).
14
See id. (explaining that the ouster doctrine was the rationale for this approach.).
See also Tom Cullinan, Note, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review
in Arbitration Agreements, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 408–12 (1998); Buckeye Check
Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Mistubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985); Julius Henry Cohen
& Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 Va. L. Rev. 265, 270–71
(1926).
15
See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 577, 599–600 (1997) (describing the
historical reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements). See also Tom Cullinan, Note,
Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 51
Vand. L. Rev. 395, 408–09 (1998) (“[B]y adopting the English law, American courts
were infected with a hostility toward arbitration not normally found in other cultures
. . . . The ultimate effect of this hostility was the courts’ refusal . . . to force parties to
fulfill executory agreements to arbitrate.”).
16
Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746) (from this case emerged the ‘ouster
doctrine.’).
17
William M. Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration, 48-3
Arb. J., Sept. 1993, at 27 (explaining that because there were no procedural safeguards
for arbitration prior to 1855, courts feared a “miscarriage of justice”).
18
Id. at 28 (noting that British judges in 1800’s England collected fees from the
litigants).
13
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commercial interests.19 However, this hostility towards arbitration, so
endemic to English courts, traveled with the British colonies and was
later enveloped into the mindset of the new legal system adopted by the
post-revolution United States.
As in England, hostility towards arbitration in the United States
began to disperse with the advent of industrialization. 20 Industrialization
fueled an increase in business disputes, which in turn began to burden
the courts.21 For the sake of efficiency, the practice of arbitration had
to be legitimized and protected. Therefore, deciding that the common
law rule allowing agreements to be revoked prior to the rendering of an
award should no longer apply, courts called for legislative action.22 In
response, Congress passed the FAA, modeled after a New York statute
enacted in 1920.23
Congress’ authority to enact the FAA derives from the Commerce
Clause24 as well as from congressional powers to control procedure in
the federal courts.25 Through the FAA, Congress intended to give arbitration agreements the same weight as any other type of contract.26 The
goal of the FAA was not to create an alternative judicial mechanism that
would ‘oust’ the court’s authority, but rather, to provide a procedure for
federal courts to enforce arbitral awards and address the concerns of the
business community over cost and timeliness.27

See Arbitration Act, 1698, 9 & 10 Will. 3, ch. 15 (Eng.).
See, e.g., 5 Nyu. J.L. & Bus. at 746–54 (2009) (detailing the history of arbitration
law in the United States).
21
See Helm, supra note 8.
22
See 78 Fordham L. Rev. at 1817.
23
S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 3 (noting that the FAA follows the 1920 New York statute).
24
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“The Federal Arbitration
Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce
Clause.”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967)
(“[T]he federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable
federal foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.’”) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 96, 1 (1924); S. Rep. No. 536, 3 (1924)).
25
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (“[T]
he question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct
themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to
legislate. The answer to that can only be in the affirmative.”).
26
See 78 Fordham L. Rev. at 1817–18 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1).
27
Id. at 1818; Howard, supra note 17, at 28.
19
20
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II. Grounds for Vacatur of Arbitral Awards
A. Vacatur, Modification, and Correction of Awards under
Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA
The FAA, a legislation that applies to all contracts affecting interstate commerce,28 provides expedited state and federal judicial review
to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitral awards.29 Under § 10(a), parties
can seek vacatur of an arbitral award for the following four reasons:30
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
(2) the arbitrators were evidently biased or corrupt;
(3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, such as the
refusal to postpone a hearing when sufficient cause for
the postponement was shown, refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy, or any other
misbehavior that resulted in prejudice to the parties; or,
(4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or executed
those powers so imperfectly, that their decision cannot
be deemed to be final.
While the first three reasons address fairness, impartiality and procedural issues,31 the last one focuses on the correctness of the award. These
grounds—especially the first three—are very narrow and extremely difficult to invoke.32 The final, and most popular, ground allows the courts
more power to make revisions.
Pursuant to § 10(a)(4), courts will examine the reasoning that produced the award within the arbitrators’ limitations.33 Ultimately, the
same spirit found behind the enactment of the FAA guides a presumption among courts in favor of confirming arbitral awards.34
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278–81 (holding that the
term ‘involving commerce’ in section 2 of the FAA was consistent with Congressional
exercise of its powers under the commerce clause).
29
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
30
9 U.S.C. §10(a).
31
Helm, supra note 8, at 2.
32
Id. at 1822 (explaining that the grounds for vacatur under §10 address ‘egregious
departures’ from the role of arbitrators and ‘serious procedural irregularities’) (citing
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1121 (3d Cir. 1975)).
33
Helm, supra note 8, at 4–5.
34
Id.
28
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B. Non-Statutory Grounds for Vacatur and “Manifest
Disregard”
In addition to the grounds specified in the FAA, courts have also
carved out a series of non-statutory grounds for reviewing arbitral
awards.35 Nationwide, courts have historically used these judiciallyfashioned grounds to correct and vacate improper arbitral awards and
further the interests of justice without hindering the arbitral process.36
The most commonly invoked non-statutory ground for review is without
a doubt the “manifest disregard” doctrine; despite recent and exciting
changes in the law,37 the manifest disregard doctrine remains the most
popular non-statutory basis for vacatur of arbitral awards in the United
States.38
Before 1953, federal courts followed strict standards for vacatur of
arbitral awards by adhering closely to the FAA.39 Wilko v. Swan, a case
involving a buyer who sought to recover damages from a broker for
misrepresentation under the Securities Act,40 overruled previous case
law. In Wilko, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the trial court over whether to grant the broker’s motion
to stay the proceedings until arbitration concluded, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.41 Specifically, the Court was troubled by the
fact that, to resolve this dispute, the arbitrator had to make “subjective
findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator of the
Act.”42 These subjective findings were a problem for the court because
the findings were not guided by any legal instruction.43 In other words,
Id.
See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street,
113 Penn St. L. Rev. 1103 (2009) (explaining the different kinds of non-statutory
grounds for reviewing arbitral awards).
37
See 78 Fordham L. Rev. at 1823.
38
See Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 355 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that manifest disregard “means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to
the law. The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.”).
39
See 5 NYU J.L. & Bus. at 761 (explaining how Wilko was the first time the
Court “opened the door to possibly recognizing non-statutory grounds for vacating an
arbitration award.”).
40
346 U.S. 427, 427 (1953).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 435–36.
43
Id. at 436.
35
36
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the arbitral award could be made without any explanation of the reasons
for reaching it, and the arbitral award could be reached without a complete record of the proceedings.44 While the Supreme Court’s decision
in favor of the claimant was ultimately overturned on other grounds, the
dicta remains influential.45
The Court also pointed out the general difficulty in vacating arbitral
awards. Pursuant to the incredibly high standards of § 10(a), it was very
challenging to show that the arbitrators had failed to correctly interpret and apply the Securities Act.46 Because the protective provisions
found in the Securities Act demanded judicial discretion to ensure their
own effectiveness, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress must
have intended for the possibility of courts to review arbitral decisions
that display manifest disregard in “interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators.”47
After Wilko, circuit courts adopted manifest disregard—albeit
only in rare instances—as an instrument to vacate arbitral awards.48 A
large number of states also followed the federal circuits in recognizing
manifest disregard as a legitimate way to vacate arbitral awards.49 Not
all courts or states, however, applied the doctrine in the same way.50
Manifest disregard was invoked as an emergency measure, and was

Courts, therefore, could not review the arbitrator’s conception of the legal meaning
of certain statutory requirements, such as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care,’ and
‘material fact.’ Id.
45
Id. (finding that (1) the right to choose a judicial forum cannot be validly waived;
(2) an agreement to arbitrate future controversies between securities brokers and
buyers constitutes a ‘stipulation’ binding the buyer to waive compliance with such
Securities Act provision; and (3) such agreement is invalidated by the act’s express
prohibitions against waiver) (overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See 5 NYU J.L. & Bus. at 762 (citing Collins v. D. R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874,
879 (9th Cir. 2007)); Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir.
2006); Cytyc Corp. v. Deka Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2006).
49
Id. at 767–68 (some states also construed manifest disregard as one of the grounds
for vacatur written in their own state arbitration laws).
50
See id. at 763–64 (describing the different ways that circuits applied the manifest
disregard standard).
44
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limited to “rare occurrences of apparent egregious impropriety,” where
§ 10(a)(1)–(4) did not apply, or where the law had been disregarded.51
III. Unpacking the Hall Street Decision
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Hall Street v. Mattel52 to
address a split in the circuit courts regarding the grounds for judicial
review of arbitral awards under the FAA.53 Specifically, the United
States Courts of Appeal for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits found that
parties could not contractually expand the grounds for judicial review
beyond those explicit in the FAA.54 On the contrary, the First, Third,
Fifth and Sixth Circuits argued that, under very limited circumstances,
the FAA could be displaced.55
Hall Street involved a dispute between the plaintiff landlord and
the defendant tenant over a manufacturing site.56 The lease agreement
required the tenant to indemnify the landlord for any expenses resulting
from a failure to follow environmental laws, but also applied to cases
where the tenant’s predecessors had failed to follow environmental
laws.57 When subsequent environmental tests showed that defendant
Mattel’s predecessors had been contaminating the water for almost
thirty years, they signed a consent order for cleanup of the water with
one of the former tenants of the manufacturing site.58 In 2001, Mattel
Helm, supra note 8, at 9–10; see also Kergosien, 390 F.3d at 353 (“the term
‘disregard’ implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.”). Different courts have also
set out guidance on how to interpret this standard, such as the 2nd Circuit, which has
found that there are three main components of the doctrine that may guide the courts
when applying it: (1) the law allegedly ignored was clear and explicitly applicable to
the matter before the arbitrators; (2) the law was in fact improperly applied, leading to
an erroneous outcome; and (3) the arbitrators must have known of the existence of this
law and of its applicability to the matter at hand. See T.Co. Metals, L.L.C. v. Dempsey
Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2010).
52
552 U.S. 576 (2008).
53
See Hall St. Assocs., 550 U.S. 968 (2007) (granting certiorari).
54
See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir.
2001).
55
See P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); Jacada
(Eur.) Ltd. v. Intl. Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2005).
56
Hall Street Ass., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
57
Id. at 579.
58
Id.
51
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gave notice of intent to terminate the lease, prompting Hall Street to file
a lawsuit contesting, among other issues, Mattel’s right to vacate without
covering the ongoing costs of cleanup.59 Mattel won on the issue of the
termination of the lease at the district court level and the parties agreed
to submit to arbitration to resolve the remaining issues after mediation
proved ineffective.60 The arbitration agreement provided, inter alia, that
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon had the power
to “enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award
or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award.” Specifically, the
agreement provided that the court would vacate, modify or correct the
award “(i) where the arbitrator’s findings or facts are not supported by
substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are
erroneous.”61
The arbitration also resulted in Mattel’s victory. The arbitrator found
that the obligations in the lease did not require Mattel to comply with
the testing requirements of the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act
(“the Act”) because the arbitrators considered this Act to cover matters of human health and not environmental contamination.62 Therefore,
the arbitrator reasoned, Mattel did not have to indemnify Hall Street
under their lease agreement. In response, Hall Street filed a motion to
vacate, modify or correct the award at the District Court, based on the
theory that failing to consider the Act as an applicable environmental
law under the lease constituted a legal error.63 The District Court agreed
with Hall Street and vacated the award, remanding the issue to the arbitrator for further consideration. The arbitrator ruled for Hall Street this
time and the District Court affirmed. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled
in favor of Mattel and Hall Street sought, and was granted, certiorari by
the Supreme Court.
The Hall Street Court held that under the FAA, parties to an arbitration agreement are not allowed to contractually expand the grounds for
judicial review of an arbitral award beyond those already articulated in

There were other issues in dispute which are not important to the current
discussion. see Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 579.
62
Id. at 580.
63
Id.
59
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§§ 10 and 11 of the FAA.64 In reaching this decision, the Court rejected
petitioner Hall Street’s theories supporting the right to contractual
expansion of grounds for vacatur or modification. Namely, that (1)
the Court had accepted the expansion of arbitral awards since Wilko v.
Swan65 and (2) because arbitration is a “creature of contract” and the
FAA symbolizes congressional intent to protect contracts, contractual
agreements permitting judicial review for legal error should be valid.
In rejecting these arguments, the Court clarified that § 9 of the FAA,
which rigidly states that courts must (emphasis added) confirm an award
unless it is modified or vacated according to §§ 10 and 11,66 is not a
default provision.67 Even if §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA could be expanded,
the court felt such expansion would create glaring inconsistencies
with § 9 of the FAA.68 The Court went on to concede the existence of
a national policy favoring arbitration69 but emphasized the FAA’s high
threshold for modification, correction and vacatur of arbitral awards,

See Brian B. Burns, Note, Freedom, finality, and federal preemption: Seeking
expanded judicial review of arbitration awards under state law after hall street, 78
Fordham L. Rev. 1814, 1843 (2010).
65
Specifically, Hall Street argued that because the Court recognized Manifest
Disregard as a valid ground for reviewing arbitral awards outside of §10, it should also
allow contractual expansion of those grounds. See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586.
66
9 U.S.C. § 9 (2005) (“If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment
of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to
the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award,
and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified,
or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in
the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States
court in and for the district within which such award was made.”) (emphasis added).
67
See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586 (the Court read §5 of the FAA (a section the Court
considered Congress intended to be read as a default provision) and compared it to
§9). See also 9 U.S.C. §5 (2006) (“If in the agreement provision be made for a method
of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall
be followed; but if no method be provided therein . . . the court shall designate and
appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators . . .”).
68
Id. at 577 (explaining that supplementing §§ 10 and 11 “would stretch basic
interpretive principles to expand their uniformly narrow stated grounds to the point of
legal review generally . . .”).
69
See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586 (“a national policy favoring arbitration with just the
limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.”).
64
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which prioritized finality over the parties’ autonomy in shaping the arbitration process.70
In interpreting the FAA, the Court applied ejusdem generis,71 arguing that because § 10 lacks a textual basis for expansion, there can be no
authorization for contracting parties to “supplement review for specific
instances of outrageous conduct with review for just any legal error.”72
The Court then emphasized the stark contrast between reviewing for
legal error—what the parties in this case sought to do in their arbitration
agreement—and egregious conduct—what the FAA requires as grounds
for vacatur.73 In the end, Hall Street established that while autonomy of
the parties trumps efficiency,74 preserving finality in the arbitral process
is still the most important.75 Some scholars have even argued that, had
the Court prioritized autonomy over finality, the institution of arbitration itself would have been undermined, making Hall Street a pivotal
moment in the evolution of modern arbitration.76
A. Did Hall Street Eliminate Manifest Disregard?
Post-Hall Street, courts,77 legal scholars,78 and practitioners79 have
developed theories about the fate of manifest disregard.80 Some argue
that Hall Street effectively eliminated manifest disregard, while othSee Burns, supra note 26.
Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586 (explaining that ejusdem generis means that “when a
statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term
is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows.”).
72
Id. at 586–87.
73
Id. at 586 (“‘Fraud’ and a mistake of law are not cut from the same cloth.”).
74
See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (holding that when
the values of efficiency and autonomy conflict, the result should favor autonomy).
75
See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586 (noting that otherwise, the result would be a flood
of “full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals” and “bring arbitration theory to grief in
post-arbitration process.”).
76
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration in a Nutshell 58–59 (2d ed. 2009) (arguing
that expanded review “would deprive the arbitral process of its autonomy and injure
the institution of private adjudication”).
77
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008).
78
See 5 NYU J.L. & Bus. at 773.
79
See Thomas E.L. Dewey & Kara Siegel, Room for Error: ‘Hall Street’ and the
Shrinking Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, N.Y.L.J., May 15, 2008, at 23
(explaining that Hall Street apparently undermined the validity of manifest disregard).
80
See 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 1191 (“arguing that the narrow holding in Hall
Street created new questions, including the current validity of the manifest disregard
doctrine.”).
70
71
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ers maintain that the doctrine has survived either because it fits within
§ 10(a)(4) or for other reasons.81 The Hall Street Court explained in
dicta that it decided “nothing about other possible avenues for judicial enforcement of awards,”82 thereby limiting the Court’s decision in
regards to the FAA and retaining the possibility of expansion of judicial
review under other circumstances.83 The Court also named a few ways
for parties to obtain expanded review, including through common law,84
state statutory law,85 and a court’s discretion to manage its docket under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.86 However, the Court chose not to
discuss how those alternatives would play out, leaving a glaring question as to the continued existence of manifest disregard.87 At this time,
it is still unclear whether manifest disregard was eliminated by the Hall
Street decision, and lower courts have decided differently on the issue.88
1. Two Schools of Thought and the Exclusivity Theory
The Hall Street Court acknowledged that its holding would cause
confusion as to the fate of manifest disregard, but did not clarify how
lower courts should interpret this doctrine in future decisions.89 Since
See supra n. 85–87. Also judicially-crafted vacatur standards that most circuits
have recognized; including “completely irrational” or “against public policy.”
82
See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 577; see Robert Ellis, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered
Questions in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
1187, 1188 (2009) (explaining that the holding in Hall Street was so narrow that it
avoided deciding “potentially divisive issues” but at the same time that the issue that
the Court did resolve “raised many new questions.”).
83
See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 590 (“The FAA is not the only way into court for parties
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state
statutory or common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is
arguable.”).
84
See Hall St. at 1406 (“[T]hey may contemplate enforcement under state statutory
or common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is arguable.”).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1407 (“[S]hould the agreement be treated as an exercise of the District
Court’s authority to manage its cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16?”).
87
Id. at 1406–07 (“But here we speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial
review under §§ 9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.”).
88
See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects
for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 929, 938 (2010); 5
NYU J.L. & Bus. at 774–80 (describing how courts were split after Hall Street as to
whether manifest disregard still applied).
89
See id. at 1192.
81
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its origins over fifty years ago, manifest disregard has been interpreted
in many different ways including: as a separate ground for review outside of § 10;90 as a reference to the group of § 10 grounds;91 and as a
shorthand for §§ 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4).92 Some courts argue that Hall
Street abolished manifest disregard while others have urged that manifest disregard survives as part of § 10 of the FAA. A third, perhaps most
persuasive, theory is that manifest disregard, along with other common
law standards of vacatur, is left intact by the Court’s exclusivity theory.93
a. Manifest Disregard Post-Hall Street
Both state and federal courts, including the First, Fifth, Eleventh,
and Eighth Circuits, have reached the conclusion that Hall Street marked
the end of manifest disregard as an independent ground for vacatur.94
This conclusion has been applied by district courts in the First,95 Fifth, 96

See, e.g., McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st. Cir.
2006); Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Prestige Ford v.
Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2003); Scott v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (11th Cir. 1998).
91
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
656 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re I/S Stavborg v. Nat’l Metal Converters, Inc.,
500 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1974). See also 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 929.
92
See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997.
93
The theory that the FAA grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitral awards
are exclusive.
94
See Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 Fed. App’x 186, 196 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Some courts
have decided that manifest disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for
vacating arbitration awards under the FAA.”).
95
See ALS & Assocs., Inc. v. AGM Marine Constructors, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 180,
184 n.5, 185 (D. Mass. 2008).
96
See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he statutory grounds [for vacatur within the FAA] are exclusive,” therefore,
“manifest disregard of the law as an independent, non-statutory ground for setting
aside an award must be abandoned and rejected.”).
90
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Eighth, 97 and Third Circuits, 98 as well as some Texas courts of appeals,99
and the Supreme Court of Alabama.100 District courts in Massachusetts
and Minnesota also follow this approach.101 However, this characterization of Hall Street’s exclusivity theory is beyond the scope of the Hall
Street decision.
Similarly, several courts have re-conceptualized manifest disregard as within § 10 of the FAA.102 The Second,103 Seventh104 and
Ninth Circuits105 follow this approach. Other courts, including district
courts in the Third Circuit,106 the Delaware Court of Chancery,107 and
a New York trial court,108 also believe that manifest disregard can be
See Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Simmonds, No 4:08CV90 FRB, 2009 WL 367703,
at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2009); Prime Therapeutics, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
98
See Martik Bros., Inc. v. Kiebler Slippery Rock, L.L.C., No. 08CV1756, 2009
WL 1065893, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2009); Southco, Inc. v. Reell Precision Mfg.
Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509–10 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
99
See Ancor Holdings, LLC v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W. 3d, 818,
829 (Tex. Ct. App. (Dallas) Aug. 25, 2009); Allsteyle Coil Co. v. Carreon, No. 01-0700790-CV, 2009 WL 1270411, at *2 (Tex. App. 2009); Chandler v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., L.L.C., No. 04-08-00100-CV, 2009 WL 538401, at *3 (Tex. App. Mar. 4, 2009).
100
See Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 1070396, 2009 WL 104666, at *5, *5 n.1
(Ala. Jan. 9, 2009).
101
See, e.g., ALS & Assocs. Inc. v. AGM Marine Constructors Inc., 557 F. Supp.
2d 180, 185 (D. Mass. 2008) (applying Ramos-Santiago); Prime Therapeutics, 555 F.
Supp. 2d at 999.
102
See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94 (noting that manifest disregard can survive Hall
Street when “reconceptualized as a judicial gloss on the specific grounds for vacatur
enumerated in section 10 of the FAA”). See also Mastec N. Am., Inc. v. MSE Power
Sys., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale,
859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 349 (2008).
103
See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94–95.
104
See George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2001)
(even before Hall Street, the Seventh Circuit considered manifest disregard as a
statutory doctrine).
105
See Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 2009)
(in which the court held that manifest disregard was a shorthand for § 10(a)(4) of the
FAA and decided that Hall Street did not preclude federal courts from reviewing an
arbitral award for the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.).
106
See Vitarroz Corp. v. G. Willi Food Int’l Ltd., No. 05-5363, 2009 WL 1844293, at
*5 (D.N.J. June 26, 2009).
107
See TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel Sec., Inc., 953 A.2d 726, 732
(Del. Ch. 2008).
108
See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348–49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2008).
97
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re-conceptualized within the FAA. However, this characterization is not
necessarily the only way in which to maintain manifest disregard while
adhering to Hall Street.
Hall Street ultimately decided that the grounds for vacatur listed
in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are “exclusive.” This so-called “exclusivity theory” holds that the standards for vacatur enumerated in the FAA
cannot be expanded by private contract, but could be expanded in other
ways. This narrow reading resolves the conflict between the common
interpretation of Hall Street and the manifest disregard doctrine (as
well as other similar common law doctrines).109 The Sixth Circuit has
already applied the exclusivity theory in Coffee Beanery,110 reversing
the lower court’s confirmation of an arbitral award due to manifest disregard.111 In this decision, the court stated that while Hall Street precludes parties from expanding grounds for vacatur, it does not disturb
judicially-invoked manifest disregard as an independent ground.112 The
fact that parties are no longer allowed to contractually expand grounds
for vacatur does not preclude judges from doing so during a proceeding.
Through judicial action, rather than private contract, it can be reasoned
that expanding these grounds can further important policy goals or prevent unfair arbitral results.113
Conclusion
In deciding whether parties can contractually expand the grounds
for vacatur of arbitral awards, Hall Street has opened a new set of questions. Chief among them is whether manifest disregard still stands as a
valid or permissible mechanism of judicial review. However, the Court’s
decision only addressed what private parties—and not judges—are
enabled to do contractually to expand vacatur grounds. This supports a

See 119 Yale L.J. Online at 5.
300 F. App’x 415, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 81 (2009).
111
See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. App’x. 415 (6th Cir. Mich.
2008).
112
See id. at 418–19 (explaining that it would be imprudent to cease to apply manifest
disregard because the doctrine had been ‘universally recognized’ for a long time).
113
The Court itself noted that “private expansion by contract” and “judicial expansion
by interpretation” are analytically different. See Hall St., 555 U.S. 576, 585.
109
110
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belief that the Court did not intend to do away with manifest disregard
altogether.
The survival of manifest disregard does not undermine the value and
effectiveness of arbitration as a method for resolving disputes. While
ensuring finality is paramount to restoring faith in the arbitral process,
so is ensuring justice (or at least ensuring that there are means to prevent
injustice). Manifest disregard is an important tool that allows judges
some flexibility to protect the public interest and prevent unfair binding
results. Manifest disregard also balances out the impossibly high standards for modification and vacatur of arbitral awards made available in
the FAA. Some courts have continued to use this half-century old doctrine. It has proven to be an effective method for judges to exercise their
ability to preserve fairness and further important policy goals. Because
this country has maintained a national policy favoring arbitration, and
because the grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitral awards are
extremely narrow, the manifest disregard doctrine should survive Hall
Street.

